

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE EIGHTEENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Wednesday, 11 April 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. BARRINGTON

(Burma)

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Mr. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Bulgaria:

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Mr. K. CHRISTOV
Mr. N. MINTCHEV
Mr. G. GUELEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON
U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. J.E.G. HARDY
Mr. J.F.M. BELL
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK
Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. E. PEPIKH
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. GEBRE-EGZY
Mr. P. SAHLU
Mr. M. HAMID
Mr. A. MANDETRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. C.K. CAROLA
Mr. M.B. NAIR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

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Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI-OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. S. GONZALEZ GALVEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LACHS
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Baron C.H. von PLATEN
Mr. H. BLIX
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV
Mr. I.G. USACHEV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Mr. D.N. BRINSON

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. R. SPIERS
Mr. S.H. McINTYRE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the eighteenth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): The problem of concluding a treaty for the cessation of all tests of nuclear weapons has been discussed during at least five of the eighteen plenary meetings of this Conference. The three nuclear Powers here represented have set forth their points of view at great length. But up to now, I am sorry to say, this has not produced any apparent movement towards common agreement.

All this time during the past four weeks, each one of us has been acutely aware that the issue of a nuclear test ban treaty is not an academic question. Indeed, it has been clear that without a sound workable and effective treaty which is mutually acceptable to the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States, the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments, which was unilaterally resumed in September 1961 by the Soviet Union, will unfortunately continue.

In fact, the United States has announced its tentative plans to conduct a number of nuclear tests in the atmosphere above the Pacific Ocean beginning in the latter half of this month unless a test ban agreement with effective international controls has been reached beforehand.

As far as the two Western nuclear Powers are concerned, there is only one major obstacle to the conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty. This is the refusal of the Soviet Union to agree even to the principle, much less to the minimally essential substance, of effective international control to monitor the enforcement of a test ban treaty. This is crucial because, much as the United States and the United Kingdom desire the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests -- and they do -- they cannot enter upon any such commitment until they have reasonable assurance that technically effective, impartial and internationally acceptable means of detection and identification will be available to maintain a continual check on the implementation of the treaty's provisions by all signatories.

At this difficult and fateful moment, when so much depends on the good will, good sense, reasonableness and flexibility of all three nuclear Powers in seeking a way out of the existing deadlock, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom have issued a joint statement to apprise the

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world of the situation which has arisen. This statement was also handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in Moscow on 9 April. I shall read this statement into the record and ask that it be circulated as a Conference document.^{1/} The text of the joint statement is as follows:

"Discussions among ourselves and the Soviet Union about a treaty to ban nuclear tests have been going on in Geneva for nearly a month. The Soviet representatives have rejected international inspection or verification inside the Soviet Union to determine the nature of unexplained seismic events which might be nuclear tests.

"This is a point of cardinal importance to the United States and the United Kingdom. From the very beginning of the negotiations on a nuclear test ban treaty, they have made it clear that an essential element of such a treaty is an objective international system for assuring that a ban on nuclear tests is being observed by all parties. The need for such a system was clearly recognized in the report of the scientific experts which was the foundation of the Geneva negotiations. For nearly three years this need was accepted by the Soviet delegation at Geneva. There was disagreement about details, but the principle of objective international verification was accepted. It was embodied in the treaty tabled by the United States and the United Kingdom on 18 April 1961, which provides for such a system. Since the current disarmament meetings began in Geneva, the United States and the United Kingdom have made further efforts to meet Soviet objections to the 18 April treaty. These efforts have met with no success, as is clearly shown by the recent statements of the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union and of their representative in Geneva, Mr. Zorin, who have repeatedly rejected the very concept of international verification. There has been no progress on this point in Geneva; the Soviet Union has refused to change its position.

"The ground given seems to be that existing national detection systems can give adequate protection against clandestine tests. In the present state of scientific instrumentation, there are a great many cases in which we cannot distinguish between natural and artificial seismic disturbances as opposed to recording the fact of a disturbance and locating its probable epicenter. A treaty therefore cannot be

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made effective unless adequate verification is included in it. For otherwise there would be no alternative, if an instrument reported an unexplained seismic occurrence on either side, between accepting the possibility of an evasion of the treaty or its immediate denunciation. The opportunity for adequate verification is of the very essence of mutual confidence.

"This principle has so far been rejected by the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and there is no indication that he has not spoken with the full approval of his Government. We continue to hope that the Soviet Government may reconsider the position and express their readiness to accept the principle of international verification. If they will do this, there is still time to reach agreement. But if there is no change in the present Soviet position, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom must conclude that their efforts to obtain a workable treaty to ban nuclear tests are not now successful, and the test series scheduled for the latter part of this month will have to go forward."

That is the end of the joint statement by the heads of Government of the United States and the United Kingdom. We earnestly hope, and submit, that it will assist the leaders of the Soviet Government to reappraise their now rigid positions. Indeed, in the past weeks we have analysed in great detail the various arguments which the Soviet Union has advanced. I do not wish to review them all again this morning -- in fact that would take much too long -- but I should like to set forth and compare the stand taken by the two sides on a series of questions.

I shall first try to summarize the Soviet position, as I understand it, accurately and fairly. I should say that it runs along the following lines.

One: Once a test ban treaty has been signed by the nuclear Powers and other States it will not be violated, because nations generally adhere to their solemn treaty commitments. However, to the extent that any one side may have some lingering doubts about the faithfulness of the other side in living up to its obligations, compliance with the treaty can be effectively monitored by existing national control systems.

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Two: Such national systems -- and I am still giving the Soviet point of view -- are fully capable of detecting and identifying clandestine nuclear detonations in all environments, and whatever doubts may have existed a few years ago on this score have been swept away by scientific advances. This is proved, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, by registration throughout the world of recent Soviet and United States nuclear tests.

Three: In any case -- so goes the Soviet argument -- to utilize international control system arrangements at this time would open the door to misuse of the system for espionage purposes, and this is doubly unwise at a time when existing national systems of control can do a good job of control.

So much for the present Soviet stand as I understand it. Perhaps I have been too brief in describing it, but I hope that Mr. Zorin will confirm that I have not omitted any salient points.

Let me now set forth the position of the United States.

One: We sincerely hope that any nuclear test ban treaty which is signed will not be violated. But, frankly, as with any other measure of disarmament which vitally affects interests of national military security, we just cannot afford to take unreasonable risks in this regard.

Two: We have been very constructive, very scientific and very reasonable, but we must require that any treaty provide for an adequate and effective system of control. To us, adequate and effective control must mean international control as spelt out by the Geneva experts in 1958. Only objective international control can produce data and analyses of data which will generate world-wide confidence; and only a network of international control posts, only international on-site inspection procedures, and only an international headquarters can meet scientific requirements for effective operations.

Three: Moreover, despite many statements to the contrary, and despite very thorough research by our scientists, we know of no recent scientific advancements which would in any significant or material way modify the conclusions and recommendations of the scientists of the eight countries, including the Soviet Union, who met in Geneva in 1958 and who advised the creation of an international control system. Indeed, we note that as late as July 1961 the Soviet Government also approved of these scientific conclusions, arrived at in 1958.

Four: Finally, we cannot understand concern about the misuse of the control system for espionage purposes. The procedures envisaged are themselves the

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product of long negotiation and compromise between the Soviet Union and the West, and analysis of such procedures shows no possibility whatsoever for misuse.

Such are the fundamental positions of the two sides, presented as impartially and fairly as I can state them.

Now I should like to comment upon them -- of course, it may be said that I do not comment as a completely impartial observer, because I am after all the representative of one of the nuclear Powers. But, as objectively as I know how, I shall comment on these positions within the framework of the Western point of view.

First, on the need for any control facilities at all, whether international or non-international, which involve detection, identification and inspection, it is my belief that the position of the United Kingdom and United States is scientifically unassailable. Too much has been said by Mr. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and too much has been included in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles of 20 September 1961 (ENDC/5) to leave any doubt that in this world, torn by mutual doubts and suspicions, some sort of reliable system of verification is essential to monitor the implementation of agreements which impinge on the sensitive national security interests of States. To think otherwise, I submit, could be suicidal. The Soviet side has on occasion argued that such controls are appropriate only in the case of disarmament agreements, whereas, they claim, a nuclear test ban treaty is not a measure of disarmament.

For our part, we have pointed out that a nuclear test ban treaty, by blocking the development of ever-newer nuclear weapons, would indeed be a genuine step of preventive or anticipatory disarmament. However, quite apart from such questions of definition and semantics, I think that it must be accepted that controls are appropriate over any measure, such as a nuclear test ban, which so directly affects the international military posture of any nuclear Power and which, therefore, can play a major role in the international military balance of power.

Second, there is the problem of whether any international control system, whatever the basic scientific need for it and whatever its technical merits, must nevertheless be cast aside because it will inevitably harm the internal security of a State to have foreign control personnel on its territory.

Here again I believe that the two Western Powers have made out a case which cannot be contradicted.

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In our view, the only way in which the espionage potential of an objective international control system can be judged is through an examination of the detailed provisions, procedures and planned operations of the system itself. Indeed, it is not relevant to discuss the problem of whether the great Powers may wish to seek to acquire intelligence information about each other; the only point is whether the particular nuclear treaty control system under consideration does have any potential for espionage abuse, even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that one of the signatory Powers might desire so to abuse it.

The completely negative answer which we have given in the case of the nuclear test ban control system has been documented many times in the records of these meetings, and no contrary analysis of this question of espionage has ever been offered by the Soviet delegation.

Not only are the control provisions of the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty of 18 April 1961, as since amended, themselves the product of countless hours of patient negotiation and patient compromise between Western and Soviet representatives in Geneva; not only were many of these provisions once accepted fully by the Soviet delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests; not only do these provisions put the Soviet Union in an absolutely equal position in every respect with the two Western Powers in all questions of authority and operations in the control system; and not only do the provisions allow exactly the same controls to be applied in Western countries as in the Soviet Union; but the actual arrangements, on even the most careful scrutiny, would not permit any foreigner either to be free of observation by Soviet citizens at any time within the Soviet Union or to move about the territory of the Soviet Union except under the most rigidly defined and rigidly restricted conditions.

Third, granted that adequate controls are necessary, and granted that the international control system here proposed by the West could not be abused for espionage objectives, is it still necessary to have an international control system when non-international control systems -- that is, national systems -- are already available? In other words, could not such existing national systems be just as good as an international system?

In commenting on this I will merely mention in passing that only an objective international system, properly financed, properly supervised and

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constantly audited, can produce data in which the world can have confidence and which will have a sufficient degree of world-wide scientific acceptance to serve as the basis for decisions and action. In other words, it would be a very serious matter in any case for any State to allege, without adequate supporting prima facie evidence, that another signatory State had probably violated the treaty by conducting a clandestine nuclear test. To have to make such allegations on the basis of data produced by national systems alone, with wide geographical gaps in their coverage, would put an almost impossible technical and political burden on any country. In all probability the alleged offending State would merely denounce as inaccurate the data and the analysis of such data given by the State which had raised the issue of a suspicious event, and no one would be able to clarify the resulting confusion of charges and countercharges.

My main comments, however, are addressed not to this aspect of the issue of international versus existing systems but to the question of the scientific adequacy of national systems. Here too, I submit, the Western position is impeccable.

To begin with, our case rests on international scientific authority. This is not a case of the word of United States scientists against that of Soviet scientists. We are speaking here of the combined words of United States, United Kingdom, French, Canadian, Soviet, Czechoslovak, Polish and Romanian scientists. They unanimously agreed on 20 August 1958 -- I stress "unanimously" -- on an assessment of control problems (EXP/NUC/28), and this unanimous assessment led them to recommend an international control system with approximately the same provisions as can be found in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty on a nuclear test ban. The Governments of the three nuclear Powers approved this scientific assessment in August 1958 and the three Governments made it the basis of negotiations at the test ban conference which followed.

The crucial point for us is that the Soviet Union actively endorsed this very international control system until July 1961. Indeed the Soviet Union began to challenge this international control system only in November 1961, after it had resumed the race in nuclear weapon tests by its series of atmospheric detonations in September, October and November 1961. We have made many enquiries in an endeavour to find scientific reasons for this about-face in the Soviet Union's position, but we have not been successful and we remain unenlightened.

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Some of the Soviet arguments in favour of national or existing systems are arguments of a general nature that were fully considered and then rejected by the Eastern and Western scientists at joint meetings in 1958, 1959 and 1960. I have already quoted, at our fifteenth meeting, a lengthy statement made in December 1959 by Soviet scientists on just why national systems cannot be relied upon and can have only an auxiliary character (GEN/DNT/TWG.2/PV.12, page 71).

Other Soviet arguments relate to alleged scientific breaks-through in the recent past, but -- and I find this very interesting -- no evidence from Soviet scientists has been set before us by the Soviet delegation. If they have the evidence, where is it?

Still other arguments are derived from the fact that the United States and United Kingdom, in their offer of 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120) for an atmospheric test ban -- which, incidentally, expired by its terms on 9 September 1961 -- stated that they would be willing to accept existing control systems as adequate for monitoring such an atmospheric ban.

This offer, of course, tells us nothing new about the technical adequacy of existing systems or the technical requirements of control. All it says is that, if the Soviet Union had been willing to show its good faith and peaceful intentions in September 1961 by calling off its atmospheric test series, then in those circumstances the Western Powers would have been willing to rely on existing control systems for a ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere -- I repeat, in the atmosphere -- and go on after that to negotiate a treaty with respect to other environments.

This did not mean that we were unaware of the technical scientific risks involved in our offer. Quite the contrary: it meant only that these risks would have been tolerable in the favourable political situation which would have arisen if the Soviet Union had cancelled its remaining tests. The same risks are obviously not tolerable in current circumstances when there has not been the slightest demonstration of Soviet good will or flexibility and when, on the contrary, the Soviet Union has made evident, by its conduct of a full series of over forty tests last autumn, just how much it values the conduct of tests for the development of new weapons for its own military security. The motivation for developing new weapons which was strong enough to lead the Soviet Union to break its self-imposed pledge not to be the first State to resume nuclear tests could well lead it to attempt the clandestine violation of a nuclear test ban treaty.

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Even more basically, the technical problems of control have been fully delineated in statements here by United Kingdom and United States representatives. We have described at considerable length just what a control system must try to accomplish, just what the international system recommended in 1958 could accomplish, and just what failings are inherent in the use of existing non-international systems.

We have indicated that the systems presently in operation do indeed have certain capabilities both of detecting larger nuclear detonations in the atmosphere, of locating their probable geographical point of origin, and of identifying them as nuclear explosions instead of as some natural phenomenon. At the same time, we have been unable to cite any identification capabilities at all as to the type of unidentified events for underwater and outer-space nuclear explosions, although existing systems admittedly do have some limited capacity for detecting such detonations under certain circumstances.

With respect to outer space, this is more fully dealt with in the report of the High-Altitude Working Group (GEN/DNT/HAT/8).

In the important underground sphere, currently-used non-international systems have no more than a limited capability of detection and location. Non-international systems have virtually no capacity to identify the nature of a detected seismic event. Indeed, recent experience with a world-wide failure even to detect United States underground detonations in Nevada gives powerful reinforcement to this assessment. In this connexion, two factors are worthy of special attention.

One point is that no scientist has ever claimed that there is any known means of identifying any detected seismic event as being a nuclear explosion in origin on the basis of the seismographic instrumentation alone. Such positive identification can result only from an objective on-site inspection. The most that anyone has ever suggested is that one or another method of screening detected seismic events can eliminate some of them from suspicion by deciding that they could have been caused only by natural phenomena -- that is, by earthquakes. The effect of this may be to reduce the number of unidentified seismic events, but nevertheless to leave a very sizeable number of unidentified events.

The second point is that the chances of identifying any significant number of detected seismic events by the above-mentioned expert interpretation of seismographic records will become progressively smaller to the degree that gaps

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are created in the world-wide network of 170 to 180 regularly-spaced control posts recommended in 1958 by the Geneva experts. This spacing of the control posts was to be 1,700 kilometres between posts in aseismic, or non-earthquake, areas, and 1,000 kilometres between posts in seismic, or earthquake, areas.

Such gaps would, of course, also reduce the ability of any control system even to detect many seismic events since there is a rapid fading of signals in zones up to 1,200 kilometres from the point of origin of the event. However, even for those seismic events which might still be detected, the seismographic recordings would be much less complete and much less valuable with serious gaps in the control post network.

In other words, if recording stations were not so located as to surround the probable epicentre of each unidentified event on all geographical sides, less data about each detected seismic event would become available, and the Geneva system as recommended by the experts in 1958 would not work as planned. The possibility of identifying the nature of such events on the basis of the distant instrument recordings alone would be correspondingly reduced; and, as a result, greater reliance would have to be put on the one remaining method of identification, namely, objective on-site inspection. The point I am making, therefore, is that on a scientific basis the more that the world-wide control post network is tampered with or subtracted from the more is there an objective need to resort to on-site inspections as the only remaining alternative method of identifying an unidentified event.

To create a situation in which more on-site inspections would be technically necessary than under present United Kingdom and United States proposals would run counter to all our efforts here in Geneva, during the negotiations in the past few years, to reduce the number of inspections to a reasonable and safe minimum. Some on-site inspections will, of course, have to be available to each nuclear side, in any case, to allow each side to select for on-site inspection some unidentified seismic events occurring on the territory of the other side. The statement of President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan which I have today read into the record emphasizes the essentiality of on-site inspections in the whole detection and identification process, but we do not want to increase the number of such essential inspections beyond what is necessary. Indeed, when we offered to amend our treaty to include all events down to zero, that is, to eliminate the threshold, we thought we were taking a large step

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forward when we did not ask for a greater number of control posts and for a greater number of on-site inspections.

Such are the scientific, historical and political facts surrounding the negotiations for a nuclear test ban treaty. They all point up the deep problem about a test ban which is set forth in clear terms in the statement of 9 April by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan.

We here in the two Western delegations can do no more than set forth the facts which make evident not only why we want a sound nuclear test ban treaty, but also why we must insist that it is too risky to free-world security to settle for a nuclear test ban treaty which amounts to a pledge that cannot be monitored in a number of essential aspects.

There is no further appeal which I can make here to my Soviet colleagues beyond the plea, which I have made many times, for them to show some reasonableness and some degree of flexibility.' As I have said before, we have never at any time put forward our treaty on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have at all times wanted our Soviet colleagues to tell us where they believe us to be wrong or incorrect, or where they think our draft treaty is unreasonable. In all of these respects they will find us most open-minded and considerate. Other than that, I, along with human beings elsewhere, indeed everywhere, can only wait for the response of the Soviet Government, and we can only hope that it will give grounds for hope and encouragement that the world may, in safety, at last be free from the detonations of nuclear weapon tests.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I shall not detain the Committee long at this stage of our discussions.

During the statement just made by the representative of the United States, he read into the record the joint statement by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan, which was delivered to the Soviet Government on 9 April 1962. I should like to add to this merely by reading into the record a message from Prime Minister Macmillan to Mr. Khrushchev, delivered on 10 April.^{1/} It reads as follows:

"Dear Mr. Chairman,

" You will have seen the joint statement about nuclear tests which the United States Ambassador and Sir Frank Roberts communicated to the Soviet Government yesterday and which President Kennedy and I are issuing today.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

"You will remember that we first discussed this problem together as long ago as 1959, when I had the pleasure of visiting you in Russia.

"I shall not repeat the arguments in the statement, but I feel that I must ask you to give the most earnest consideration to our proposal. After all, the object of verification is not to increase suspicion, but to dispel it, to identify an event as a natural one so that confidence may not be threatened. I feel sure that once the principle of international verification is accepted, there will be a real chance of reaching an early agreement as to its application. This would fill all the peoples of the world with a new sense of hope.

"Yours sincerely, Harold Macmillan."

That is the message which my Prime Minister has sent to Premier Khrushchev, and I have read it out to the Conference so that it may be included in the record together with the joint statement which my United States colleague has read out in full.

I do not wish to comment further at this stage. I understand that we are to have the opportunity to discuss this subject further at tomorrow's meeting. At the moment I would therefore merely leave it at that.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like first of all to express the Italian delegation's keen regret at the negative reports given by two members of the Sub-Committee this morning -- and the third will no doubt do the same -- on the discontinuance of nuclear tests. The Conference has today heard the message which President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan sent to Chairman Khrushchev about the need to reach an agreement as soon as possible on the final prohibition of tests under adequate international control. I am sure that the Conference will wish to reflect most deeply and seriously on this constructive appeal, the importance, urgency and conciliatory spirit of which everyone will appreciate. The Conference will no doubt have occasion to start a new discussion on tests as soon as possible, and I think that -- as our Chairman said, if I understood him correctly -- we could concentrate our attention this morning on the other subject of this meeting, which is no less important. It is on this subject that my delegation wishes to speak and that is why we asked for the floor.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

At the last few meetings the Italian delegation has reserved the right to express its opinion on the important texts submitted for our consideration, namely, article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament, (ENDC/2) and the document submitted by the United States delegation giving an outline of provisions of a basic treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world (ENDC/18).

My delegation wishes to give its opinion on these texts today without polemics or prejudice. By so doing it hopes to make a constructive contribution to the best of its ability, so that a text which fully satisfies our aims may soon be drafted. This phase of our deliberations involves us in very practical and important work, which should later serve as a guide for our future progress. It is therefore most important that the text we agree on should meet certain basic requirements, and be a useful and effective text for our later work.

I believe that the text we approve should meet two requirements: first, it should show what we want to do -- what our aims are; and secondly, it should show how we are to do it -- what methods and what criteria are to be applied.

Furthermore, the statement of the objectives of the treaty and the methods to be followed should meet two semantic requirements.

First, the text should be clear. Any confusion, any uncertainty at this point, would cause us serious difficulties later and make us lose much valuable time. It is therefore worth spending a little time on this first statement in order that it may be perfectly clear and not give rise to any further discussion.

Secondly, the text must do no more than state the essential elements of the treaty. If, at the present stage of the work, we had to go into detail and into the various specific problems -- if, in other words, we tried to include the whole treaty in this first text we are drafting -- we should find ourselves faced with insurmountable difficulties. We should embark on lengthy discussions. We know that, if we examined every detail, we should end by discussing problems which are not yet solved and will only be solved at a later stage -- we hope -- when we have been able to go more deeply into our ideas and compare them. I do not mean by that that we ought to confine ourselves to those generalities to which Mr. de Mello-Franco so humorously referred when speaking of the letter written by Catherine of Russia; but I should say that we must keep to concrete facts, without, however, going into the details of specific problems which have not yet been solved.

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I have taken the liberty of drawing the attention of delegations to these general ideas because it is in the light of such fundamental considerations that we have been studying, very objectively and without any preconceived ideas, the texts which have been submitted to us.

We have been trying to see how the different texts meet the requirements I have just mentioned, and it is in applying this principle that we find some difficulty, as I briefly observed in a previous intervention, in accepting the Soviet document, although its very detailed text may seem attractive, and although it contains a great many ideas which are, I believe, shared by all the delegations here present, in particular the Italian delegation. Nevertheless, we find two major difficulties in this text right at the start.

For the Soviet text refers to two problems of very great importance as though they were already solved, whereas they still need to be studied at length. In the first line of the first paragraph of article I we find it stated that general and complete disarmament is to be carried out over a period of four years. I do not think it possible to fix the period during this preliminary phase. We are convinced that every disarmament measure, every stage of general and complete disarmament, and, indeed, the execution of the treaty itself, must be carried out within a precise time-limit -- that exact dates must be set for their completion. A legal obligation without a date is not even an obligation. If I undertake to give Mr. Zorin 100,000 francs without specifying a date, I may very well never give them to him.

However, the time required for carrying out general and complete disarmament under effective international control cannot be determined now. No date can be set until all the measures necessary for carrying it out are defined and harmonized, until the technical abilities of the various States to carry it out have been evaluated, and until control, the procedure for applying it, and the time required for verification by the future international control organization have been specifically established.

As I have already said, what is essential and what must be very firmly laid down during this first part of our work, is that every measure, every stage of disarmament, must be carried out within a fixed period of time. That is very important. It is even fundamental.

Next, in our opinion, the Soviet text has a second grave drawback. One of its first paragraphs refers to the dismantling of foreign military bases. Here

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again it specifies, and this gives rise to difficulties at once. We know that, in dealing with disarmament, no distinction can be made between national bases and foreign bases. Where NATO is concerned, in particular, there are only bases belonging to the Atlantic defence organization, which cannot be distinguished by nationality labels. It is true that all bases, whatever their situation, will be gradually eliminated and in the end completely destroyed, as general and complete disarmament is carried out. This idea is expressed with the greatest clarity in paragraph 2 (a) of the United States proposal, as "the dismantling of military establishments, including bases".

Moreover, in our view the Soviet text has certain secondary defects, mainly of drafting, which are nevertheless of some importance. I will point out only a few.

For example, article 1, paragraph 1 provides that all armed forces shall be disbanded. We fully agree with that, but it is necessary to read on to paragraph 2 to find out that, on the contrary, a certain proportion of the forces is to be retained as national and international police. Here again we naturally agree, but we consider that these ideas should be expressed in a clearer context.

It also seems to me that the Soviet text frequently repeats the same idea. Such repetitions are not always useful. As is often the case with pleonasms, they create confusion rather than clarity. It is not a matter of erroneous statements, but of statements which, in our opinion, without going into details, have no place in the article 1, but could be included in later articles.

Let us now pass on to article 1, paragraph 2 of the Soviet text. I do not think the need to establish an organization for the preservation of peace within the framework of United Nations is made sufficiently clear: and that is a need on which I believe we are all in agreement. The reference to article 37 of the treaty, in paragraph 2, seems to me to be premature, especially as we have not yet considered article 37 at all.

In paragraph 3, I would say that it is not made sufficiently clear that States must, above all, undertake to set up an international disarmament organization, to which there is only an indirect reference concerning its competence.

Paragraph 4 states an indisputable principle: that disarmament measures must be carried out in such a way as to give no advantage to either of the parties. It does not seem to me, however, that that principle can logically be placed in an article defining the obligations of States. It is, in fact, the criterion which

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

should guide us in drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament - a criterion which we must ourselves apply in our work. In the interests of clarity and the sound guidance of our later work, we should not lump together in one and the same article, both the objective we have to work for, and the criteria we should adopt in order to attain it.

As regards the logical arrangement of the subject matter, I think the text submitted by the United States delegation offers very great advantages. I have said that the first article of a treaty should begin by defining the objectives and criteria adopted in drafting it. It is in the United States text that we find this principle applied; the objectives and principles appear immediately, with the greatest clarity and precision. That is a great advantage in itself and will, I am sure, make our subsequent work easier. I do not say that the American text could not be improved and perfected later, for it, too, may perhaps contain some repetitions which do not seem entirely necessary.

Moreover, after a close examination of section A, dealing with objectives, I should like to say that the text fully accords with our point of view, since it stresses a connexion we consider essential. General and complete disarmament can, and should, be carried out parallel to, and in conjunction with, the establishment of procedures for the settlement of international disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace. That is an absolutely essential point, and we are glad to see it stated right at the beginning. But there is another essential matter which is not mentioned in the United States text until later and which we, on the contrary, should like to see dealt with at once, in the first paragraph.

We believe it would be useful to state the three essential aims of the treaty at once, in the first paragraph: first, general and complete disarmament, with the sole exception of national and international police forces; secondly, the application of effective international control, with the establishment of specific organizations; thirdly, the establishment of a peace organization within the framework of the United Nations, with the procedure and the executive forces appropriate to its purpose.

I am therefore in favour of inserting between sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph A.1 a reminder of the need for international control, and for setting up the necessary organization. Those points are not dealt with until later in the United States text, in paragraphs A.4 and B.3.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In paragraph A.3 of the American draft, we think it would be useful to add that the United Nations forces would be equipped with armaments of an approved type which would enable the United Nations to dissuade anyone from making a threat or an armed attack, or to curb any such threat or attack effectively.

Let us now pass on to section B of the American text, dealing with principles. The draft accords, as to both form and substance, with the point of view I explained at the beginning of my statement and really constitutes a set of directives, reliable and effective, for the work we have to undertake. It also corresponds in all respects with the Joint Statement of agreed principles for disarmament negotiations, of 20 September 1961.

Then, in the interests of logic, I would suggest that paragraph 5 of section B should precede paragraph 4, since it is directly connected with the principle stated in paragraph 3.

Lastly, the Italian delegation considers that in order to facilitate our work and to achieve the clarity and effectiveness we are all aiming for, we should adopt the draft submitted by the United States delegation as the first document of our Conference, without thereby precluding its improvement by appropriate amendments.

I must again point out, however, that we are opposed to the Soviet text because of two essential points, which I have already mentioned, and because the arrangement of the subject matter could cause confusion, although we could agree to many of the Soviet statements which are very like those contained in the United States text. For this reason, I wish to express my full confidence that we can reach a final agreement on this first and most essential part of our treaty within a very short time.

I hope the Soviet delegation will be good enough to agree to postpone the discussion of certain grave problems on which there is disagreement and to accept a more logical wording of the first text we have to approve. I express this confidence because I consider that, in substance, the two texts before us ---subject to the reservations I have just made on the Soviet text -- sincerely reflect one and the same objective, one and the same desire, the objective and desire of all of us: general and complete disarmament under strict international control, accompanied by effective arrangement for the maintenance of peace.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Before expressing my views on today's discussion I should like, in view of the statements we have just heard by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, to draw the attention of the Committee to the following point. The position of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of establishing international control and inspection of nuclear weapons tests -- a position which is the main obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty on the discontinuance of all nuclear tests and which is designed to give a fresh impetus to the race to develop ever more destructive means for the mass annihilation of human beings -- is based solely on doubts with regard to the identification of underground nuclear explosions.

It is significant, that in the official statements of the United States and United Kingdom Governments which we have heard, no reference whatever is made to the detection of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space. Obviously, doubts no longer exist with regard to the detection and identification of these tests. Nevertheless, the United States, sheltering behind difficulties over the possibility of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions, difficulties that are of dubious validity and have been artificially introduced, intends, with the support of the United Kingdom, to start nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere during the next few days, despite the fact that, even in the opinion of the United States and the United Kingdom, national systems of control are adequate for the detection of such tests. There can be no justification for such actions by the United States. We shall, however, obviously revert to this question tomorrow when the Committee is to consider the results of the discussions in the three-Power Sub-Committee on cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

I shall now turn to the question which is on our Committee's agenda, and on which the previous speaker, the representative of Italy, has already spoken: part I of the draft treaty on general and complete disarmament.

The previous discussion of part I of the draft treaty has unquestionably been useful. One can say with confidence that it has already revealed a consensus of opinion on the need for an introductory section of the treaty and for the inclusion in the first few articles of provisions defining the overall scope of measures of general and complete disarmament and setting out the indispensable components of such disarmaments. It seems to us that all members of the Committee now recognize the great importance for the treaty of an introductory section.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

The representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, made the following comment in referring at an earlier meeting to the work connected with co-ordinating the introductory section of the treaty:

"We are laying the stones on which the structure is to be built".

(ENDC/PV.16, page 32).

This is a sound observation, and we agree with it.

Mr. Cavalletti has, in fact, developed this same idea today. The essential first step in drawing up the whole treaty is in fact to establish the overall scope of the obligations of States in respect of measures of general and complete disarmament. The United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, apparently also shares this view, judging by his statement that agreement on Part I of the treaty --

"... does give us a firm basis for our work in the drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament acceptable to us all..."

(ENDC/PV.16, page 12).

Thus the question of the need to define the main components of general and complete disarmament at the beginning of the treaty should be regarded as settled.

During the discussion the question has been raised of how part I or article 1 of the treaty should be drafted: should it be purely descriptive, or should we make it binding on States? This is an important question of principle which, in essence, comes down to whether we want to do really serious practical work or to remain in the realm of pious wishes that commit no one to anything.

The representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Hajek, showed very convincingly that, in the introduction to the treaty, general and complete disarmament must be defined not only as "a general and distant aim" but as "a binding, concrete task" (ENDC/PV.16, page 6). No one can deny that this statement is correct. We, the Committee, "should specify the obligations" (ibid.).

We have, indeed, no right to take any other course. For the General Assembly set up our Committee and instructed it to draw up an agreement on general and complete disarmament. All the peoples of the world expect from us, not a repetition of the past, but progress and practical action. They expect from us, not further vague documents that do not go beyond making general appeals and expressing pious wishes, but an effective and binding agreement which would provide a sound basis for the implementation of general and complete disarmament. It is, therefore, quite impossible for us to mark time and confine ourselves to looking through the Agreed Principles. We must take the next practical step.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

We note with satisfaction that this idea meets with the understanding of members of the Committee. The representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Gebre-Egzy, referred to the Agreed Principles at one of our recent meetings and said that they should be included in the document we are drawing up "in such a way as to enable us to make progress in our work" (ENDC/PV.16, page 29).

We believe that the United Kingdom representative, too, recognizes the need to go further than the Agreed Principles. At the meeting on 6 April Mr. Godber, in speaking of the stage we have now reached in the discussion of part I of the treaty, pointed out that it has become possible "to move a stage forward from the Agreed Principles" (ENDC/PV.16, page 13).

This opportunity must be used, and the obligations of States must be firmly established in respect of general and complete disarmament as a whole and of its component parts.

In view of this, the objection of the United States representative, Mr. Dean, to drafting article 1 of the treaty in the form of obligations of States is a source of surprise and concern. What reasons are given in support of that position? As we have already pointed out at a previous meeting, we have not heard any valid reasons. However, certain observations by Western representatives give us some inkling of what lies behind their objections.

At the meeting on 4 April Mr. Dean said:

"After all, the obligations to be undertaken by States comprise the sum total of the agreements we will have reached" (ENDC/PV.15, page 38).

A similar idea crept into the statement by Mr. Godber on 6 April. He took the line that, before we determine the obligations of States, we must apparently establish "exactly what measures we are going to agree upon" (ENDC/PV.16, page 11).

If the remarks of the Western representatives refer to the methods of implementing measures of general and complete disarmament, there are no differences of principle between us. If, however, their remarks relate to the general scope of measures, the extent of general and complete disarmament, it is quite a different matter. I fear that the latter is the case.

As can be seen from the main trend of their arguments at recent meetings, the Western representatives propose, as it were, that we should move backwards. The observation by Mr. Dean which I quoted makes it clear that, in his opinion, the document being prepared by the Eighteen Nation Committee will comprise the sum total of the agreements which are reached in the course of the discussion.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But it may be asked what assurance there is that this sum total will be equivalent to general and complete disarmament. For with such an approach it is extremely probable that the sum total might merely amount to the selection of a few separate, partial measures. I say "extremely probable", because the approach which Mr. Dean is advocating would be conducive to our merely reaching agreement on one or two questions, an agreement which could be represented as the attainment of the objective outlined in part I of the treaty.

One has the impression that we are again being confronted -- this time in a new form -- with the theory of separate agreements, which finds its way every now and then into the statements by Mr. Dean and the representatives of the other Western Powers.

We consider that we must not move backwards, as Mr. Dean's statement implies, but proceed directly to a complete settlement of the problem of general disarmament. If we are successfully to accomplish the task assigned to us by the General Assembly and to meet the demand of the peoples, we must impose obligations on States and create legal and moral incentives to the settlement of the practical questions arising out of the provisions of part I or article 1 of the treaty. If part I is drafted purely in the form of a declaration there will be no such incentives. It will be another matter if obligations are established. States will regard it as their duty to comply with them and will, of course, make every effort to do so.

The discussion at our last meeting points to the fact that some of the Western Powers themselves realize the soundness of such an approach to the matter. For instance, as is clear from Mr. Godber's statement on 6 April, he admits that it is obligations that must be defined. Mr. Godber used the following words in connexion with part I of the treaty: "Obligations are ... entered into in regard to the specific articles dealing with the substantive matters"

(ENDC/PV.16, page 10).

Having said this, however, he immediately lapsed into the inconsistency which seems to plague the Western representatives whenever it comes to giving formal expression to principles which have already been agreed. Mr. Godber, after making this sensible remark, for some reason began to talk about an "outline", an "outline of obligations". Why does he blur the clear and precise idea of obligations by qualifications of this kind?

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

I have already said more than once and, in order to remove any misunderstanding that may still exist, I should like to emphasize that we do not propose that we should take any hard and fast decision here and now on the language of our texts. We fully appreciate that we are still at the beginning of our work and have not yet reached the stage of putting in the final commas. Our main concern is to reach agreement on the substance of provisions and obligations and to set this down in writing.

I think that if we are motivated by a desire to see the Committee do a really business-like and practical job, we must recognize that there is no hope of our making successful progress in agreeing subsequent articles of the treaty without coming to terms on the first part of the treaty. The first part of the treaty, which defines the scope and the components of general and complete disarmament might be described as a map-charting the course leading to the complete dismantling of the war machine of States. Without it, we would lose our way in the discussion of subsequent articles and as a body, we neither would nor could have a clear sense of direction in our work or any clear understanding of the relationship of the articles we discussed to the entire problem of general and complete disarmament.

Matters might even reach the stage of our being faced with a situation in which we should be unable to agree on whether a particular article is needed at all. Such an outcome is perfectly feasible if we do not have before us a definition of the obligations of the States with respect to general and complete disarmament as a whole. This seems to me so obvious that I scarcely need to enlarge on the matter.

I should now like to deal with the substance of some of the questions touched upon during the debate on article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty and the corresponding text submitted by the United States. I shall begin with the question of a time-limit for the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

In our first statement on article 1 of our draft treaty (ENDC/PV.12, page 6), we noted on the basis of a detailed analysis of the preceding discussion that there appeared to be general recognition of the need to fix a definite time limit for the implementation of the treaty on general and complete disarmament. As you know, this assertion of ours was not questioned by anyone, although some

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doubt on the matter was expressed this morning, I believe, by the representative of Italy. In our view it is indisputable, as it is based on solid facts.

It is therefore all the more surprising that some representatives of the Western Powers should again be trying to give the impression that this point is open to question. In outlining the issues on which, as he put it, the provisions of the Soviet and United States draft "do not altogether coincide", Mr. Godber questioned the whole idea of fixing definite time-limits for general and complete disarmament. Mr. Godber said that we could not now tell how long it would take to implement the treaty on general and complete disarmament. He referred in this connexion to the transition between stages of disarmament and suggested that the question of time-limits should be set aside. The representative of Italy took essentially the same line today.

But, Mr. Godber, surely in the course of the debate the Chairman of the United Kingdom delegation, Lord Home, twice mentioned a definite period of time for general and complete disarmament, namely nine years. Therefore, at least while Lord Home was here, the United Kingdom delegation did have a definite idea of the period of time in which general and complete disarmament could be carried out, and calculations had evidently been made which led to definite conclusions. Other delegations also named specific periods.

Why, then, is it necessary to go back and introduce doubt into a matter on which a clear-cut opinion was beginning to emerge? I do not mean to say that differences of opinion on time-limits for general and complete disarmament have been completely eliminated. They clearly still exist. We know that we have three somewhat different proposals: the Soviet Union considers that it would be feasible to carry out general and complete disarmament in four years; India believes it could be done in four to five years, while the United Kingdom thinks nine years would be needed, a view which is also apparently held by Mr. Rusk. We have to agree on one figure; this is something on which we have to reach agreement, but we may perhaps have to do so at a later date.

But we already have every opportunity of recording a united point of view on the need to lay down firm time-limits for the carrying out of general and complete disarmament, in other words, to specify a single period of time. Judging by the discussion we have had, no one objects to this and indeed how can anyone object to it, since a refusal to lay down a definite time-limit for general and complete disarmament is tantamount to a refusal to carry out general and

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complete disarmament itself. In this connexion, I do not quite understand the arguments Mr. Cavalletti, the Italian representative, used today. He seemed to be contending that time limits could be set for the specific stages of disarmament, but that it is not possible at present to set time-limits for the process of general and complete disarmament as a whole. This, he maintained, can be done, but not until all the detailed arrangements have been worked out in regard to technical matters, control and all other matters.

But I should still like to hear both from the Italian representative and the other representatives of the Western Powers whether they consider it necessary and possible to set a time-limit for the implementation of general and complete disarmament as a whole or whether they do not consider this possible. They must make this clear. We consider that if we do not set a time-limit for the implementation of general and complete disarmament, there can be no disarmament. It would then be an endless process that would not be terminated in any way and would not have anything mandatory about it. There could then be no treaty on general and complete disarmament.

This is perhaps what the representatives of the Western Powers are aiming at. But if this is not essentially their position, they must make it clear whether they are for or against fixing a time-limit. If they are in favour of doing so, then, we are unanimous, and we can state that a definite time-limit must be fixed. For the time being we can leave a blank space in the text for the actual time-limit. We can return to this question later, but it is important for us to agree to a definite time-limit for the implementation of the process of general and complete disarmament as a whole. I think this is important even at the present stage of the discussion.

At the 16th meeting the representative of Czechoslovakia quite rightly pointed out that the United States document makes no reference to the total period within which general and complete disarmament is to be carried out. This is a vital shortcoming in the United States document, and must be put right. In the joint document we are to prepare, we must specify a definite period or at any rate stipulate that such a time-limit should be fixed. I do not think that this suggestion should meet with any objections.

At the 16th meeting the question was also raised of the dismantling of military bases in foreign territories. It was analysed by the representative of

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Czechoslovakia, Mr. Hajek, and also touched on by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber. Today it was also referred to by the Italian representative, Mr. Cavalletti.

Mr. Godber said that the problem of the dismantling of foreign bases could be solved and would "not be a cause for major difficulty" (ENDC/PV.16, page 11). His statement included that sentence. Nevertheless, he asserted that to "seek to differentiate foreign bases seems to me to imply some feeling that we are not going to succeed in our general disarmament task" (ibid). I must confess that Mr. Godber's last remark puzzled us. Why must we lose all hope of success in our disarmament task if we raise the question of dismantling foreign military bases?

We also find it discouraging that the representative of Italy should have laid so much stress on this point.

Mr. Godber asserted that the question of foreign bases is "an illusory point" and is not necessary. That was what Mr. Godber said. We have given much thought to this remark of Mr. Godber's in an attempt to grasp its meaning. Why does the United Kingdom representative consider that the question of foreign military bases is "an illusory point"? I must confess that I could not find an answer to this question.

However, I do not doubt that not only Mr. Godber but many other people in the United Kingdom are fully aware of the very real and concrete existence of military bases belonging to a foreign Power on British soil. They also know what a real and concrete danger they create of probable involvement in a nuclear missile war. Therefore, references to the question of dismantling foreign military bases in foreign territory being "illusory" do not in any way ring sound or true.

In his statement on 6 April the representative of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Hajek, convincingly demonstrated why military bases in foreign territory must be dismantled. He gave irrefutable arguments in support of his conclusion that foreign military bases occupy a special position and in the whole military machine of States have a quite specific mission. These bases are, if I may make the comparison, a festering sore which inflames the world, aggravates mistrust between States, and perceptibly increases the danger of a military conflict.

In addition to the points which were made so clearly by the representative of Czechoslovakia and the arguments which I put forward in my first statement on

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article 1 of the treaty, I should like, in view of Mr. Godber's observations in defence of foreign military bases, to give one more argument to show why we must specifically stipulate that foreign military bases must be dismantled, and why this question requires priority.

If no obligation were established regarding the dismantling of foreign military basis, a grave danger might threaten States honestly complying with disarmament obligations. A State with military bases in foreign territory, particularly a State separated by natural barriers from other States, as a result of its geographical situation, could make a large reduction in its armed forces in its own territory while retaining troops and military equipment in its bases in foreign territory on exactly the same scale as before. Disarmament would, be theoretically accomplished, so far as global figures are concerned. But in fact the possibility of aggression and attack would be increased immeasurably because the States at which these foreign military bases are aimed would be weakened as a result of disarmament and would have less chance of repelling an aggression launched from these bases.

The example I have given answers Mr. Godber's assertion that there is some affinity between national and foreign military bases. The reduction and dismantling of national military bases, or, to be more precise, of points at which troops and military equipment are located, are inseparably linked with the reduction and disbanding of armed forces. There is no divergence, no discrepancy here. The situation in respect of foreign military bases is completely different. During the discussion in the Committee an apt comparison was made between foreign military bases and armed assault forces. Clearly, the first step in eliminating the possibility of war would be to withdraw such troops and dismantle advance posts intended for attack. This would be the first sign of a genuine desire to set out on the path of disarmament and eliminate the risk of war.

Everything I have said further emphasizes the need to include among the general obligations of States in respect of disarmament a separate obligation relating to the dismantling of military bases in foreign territory. It also emphasizes the inadequacy of including only a general reference to the dismantling of bases.

Generally speaking, the discussion of article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty and the corresponding United States document seems to me to be drawing to a close. It must be admitted that this discussion has been extremely useful. The main

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conclusion to be drawn from it is the need to include in the agreement on general and complete disarmament which we are preparing clear and precise provisions defining the component parts of general and complete disarmament and the obligations of States in respect of these component parts. Agreement on these provisions would be a substantial and positive contribution to the settlement of the task assigned to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament by the United Nations General Assembly.

So far as our future work is concerned, it seems to me that since we have a draft article 1 of the treaty, proposed by the Soviet Union, and, as Mr. Godber said, there are already twelve points in this article on which we can agree, we should take this draft article 1 and the corresponding United States draft and try to agree on these twelve points or perhaps fifteen points which would be incorporated in a specific draft treaty.

What the Italian representative has said today requires, of course, special consideration. I do not intend to deal now with the arguments which he put forward, particularly with reference to our draft article 1. I think that he is wrong in many respects, but I am quite prepared to give careful consideration to all the points he made. I think that we shall be able to work out something acceptable to both sides in preparing the final text of article 1 of the treaty.

In any case, I think that the Soviet Union and the United States, as the authors of the two proposals and as co-Chairman, should continue their work on co-ordinating this part of the treaty too. I believe this can be completed in the very near future. If there are any observations on article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty and the corresponding part of the United States proposal, they can be taken into consideration in our work. If members of the Committee have no objection, a time-limit might be set for the submission of such observations, say, the end of this week. I would suggest Friday, so that next week we can really try to co-ordinate the position of our delegations and of all those who took part in the discussion, and to produce an agreed draft article 1 of the treaty.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): The representative of Italy and the representative of the Soviet Union have today made extensive comments on article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty and the related part I of the United States document. I listened to these comments with great interest, and I am sure they will be very helpful in the work of this Conference and in the work of the two co-Chairmen.

(Mr. Dean, United States)

I am as anxious as my Soviet colleague is to get on with this work. I should like, however, to study these remarks carefully, and I shall wish to reply in a future plenary meeting. I shall also be glad to hear any further comments which other representatives may wish to make.

I would suggest that before it is decided to submit these documents to the two co-Chairmen, or to a drafting sub-committee we take up this matter at the next plenary meeting. Since I understand that the meeting tomorrow is to be devoted to nuclear testing, I would propose to speak on this matter at our plenary meeting on Friday. If we can hear comments from the other representatives at that time also, the two co-Chairmen, or the drafting sub-committee -- whichever method the Committee prefers -- could go to work immediately on this matter.

I would again like to assure the Conference that the United States is as anxious as our Soviet colleague to get on with this matter of drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament, and we shall press forward as rapidly as we possibly can.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I wish to make one or two brief comments on the very interesting statements we have heard this morning, particularly on the statement made by the Soviet representative, who did me the honour of referring on several occasions to what I had said when we last considered part I of the proposed treaty. I listened with great interest to what he said with regard to my remarks, but I, too, would like to study his statement in the verbatim record and, if necessary, make further comments.

I was a little puzzled when, as I understood it, Mr. Zorin accused me of entering into inconsistency in regard to the question whether we should have objectives or obligations. Mr. Zorin made the point here that in these opening articles we should set down the guiding line which would give us a connecting link with the later articles. I do not disagree with that at all, nor, I think, did the remarks I made the other day indicate any disagreement. Indeed, I could not see that there was any inconsistency in my remarks. I have read them again, following this stricture by Mr. Zorin, and I will quote again what I said here:

"The main thing, of course, is that the obligations are in fact entered into in regard to the specific articles dealing with the substantive matters, to which we shall be turning in a short time.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

Therefore whatever word one uses here must, I think, be only illustrative, and whatever is agreed to in these preliminary articles can become effective only when we have agreed the substantive articles to which they refer." (ENDC/PV.16, page 10)

I stand absolutely by what I said the other day. We are at the moment engaged in what is a necessary and valuable part of our work, but it is only in the later, substantive articles that we shall really tie matters down precisely with the real and effective obligations to be entered into. Therefore, however one describes it, this is a fact from which no one can get away. I do not attach any great importance to the particular words, and the other day I suggested as a compromise on what had been put forward an outline of obligations; I thought that would be a fair way of dealing with it. But I really do not think this is in any sense a major point.

I should now like to say a word about another matter on which the Soviet representative spent a certain amount of time, that is, the question of foreign military bases. Here, again, I thought he was making very heavy weather out of the whole matter. I have re-read what I said on this subject, and again I will weary the Committee by repeating it:

"I would have thought it was basic to our whole consideration of this matter that all these bases" -- that is, foreign and home bases -- "would in fact disappear as we proceeded with the disarmament process.

"To seek to differentiate foreign bases seems to me to imply some feeling that we are not going to succeed in our general disarmament task. That is not my approach; I believe that we are going to succeed and that therefore, whether the bases are on foreign territory or anywhere else, they will be eliminated. I think that we can safely refer to all bases and that it is not necessary to differentiate." (Ibid., page 11).

That was what I said the other day, and that seems to me to be absolutely valid and sound. Nothing that I have heard from the representative of the Soviet Union has changed my view at all in relation to it.

Mr. Zorin said at one stage in his remarks this morning, and I hope that I took his words down correctly, that national bases -- referring to one's home territory -- were vitally tied in with the reduction of armed forces. But, I would submit to him, so are foreign bases. If one is going to remove, reduce and eliminate one's armed forces, then how can one maintain foreign military bases?

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I am merely pointing out that this seems to me to be an unnecessary complication which has been introduced. I shall not dwell on the reasons why this has been done. It does seem to me to be an unnecessary complication. If we really believe that we are going to reduce these armed forces to zero, then this is a phoney case. There is no justification at all, if one considers this dispassionately, for singling out this one particular item. If we are all genuinely honest and sincere in our determination completely to disarm, then this is not a matter which need or should stop us in that task. I do hope that we shall not hear too much more in regard to it. I do not honestly think that it is a matter which deserves such prominence as our Soviet colleague has given to it.

The third matter with which Mr. Zorin dealt at some length was the time-limit. Again he referred to my remarks on this question the other day. Those remarks were extremely brief. I said: "The time-limit for the disarmament process ... is one example of what I mean," -- I was referring to areas on which we were not yet in a position to reach final decisions -- "for, until we have established exactly what measures we are going to agree upon and exactly what degree of verification will be necessary for each measure, how can we possibly tell how long it is going to take?" (ENDC/PV.16, page 11)

I should have thought that what I said was eminently reasonable. I was not seeking in any way to create difficulties. I was merely pointing to the difficulties inherent in building up a treaty of this sort. I believe that we want a realistic and effective treaty. We do not want to set up target dates which are impossible of attainment. But I believe equally that we do want to set precise terms for each period of the disarmament process, and I think it is right and proper that we should. But I do not think it is right and proper for us to spend a long time discussing this before we have decided on the substantive measures of disarmament. As practical people we must realize that it will be so much easier to assess the military problems and the manpower problems of the reduction and elimination of armaments when we know exactly what we have decided on. That was all that I was seeking to say at that time.

In response to Mr. Zorin's plea for a clear and specific statement of the Western case in regard to this matter, I would refer him to the United States plan, which I think sets the position out very clearly when it says:

"Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balances, phased and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time."
(ENDC/6, page 2)

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I think that is a perfectly logical and straightforward attitude to adopt. It is the position put forward by the United States and welcomed and supported by the United Kingdom.

Mr. Zorin mentioned Lord Home's reference to nine years. But Lord Home was merely saying that Mr. Rusk had referred to a three-year process in regard to the first stage, and that as there were three stages if one were to multiply the three-year process by three, one would get the figure nine. That was the only significance in that particular suggestion. It was used only as an illustrative phrase in Lord Home's comments.

My whole point here is that this is a matter which we can and should discuss in detail at the appropriate time, and that I do not think it need delay us in our consideration of the present position.

When I spoke the other day I was at some pains to put on one side these various areas of disagreement, and I concentrated my remarks almost entirely on the points where I thought there were hopeful signs and elements of agreement. I have a very firm and definite belief that, as we proceed with our work, if we are able to establish real and effective areas of agreement confidence between us will grow and suspicion will decline. The sort of suspicion that I could not help detecting in some of Mr. Zorin's remarks this morning could, I believe, be eliminated. If we can work together, concentrating on these things on which we are agreed and, if necessary having special discussions on the points on which we are not agreed, then I believe we can generate greater confidence and make progress. It was for that reason that in my remarks the other day I concentrated on points of agreement.

I should not have referred to these remarks this morning if it had not been for the remarks made by the representative of the Soviet Union. I would beg and plead with him that we should concentrate our minds mainly on areas of agreement. Of course we must also direct our attention to areas where agreement does not exist, but let us try and discuss those points informally, perhaps between delegations; or it might be thought suitable to establish sub-committees to consider some of these problems if we have to set them on one side as we proceed with our task. But I want to press ahead with what is agreed, in the hope that we can build on that. Mr. Zorin himself has referred to building a structure. I am asking him to join with me in building a structure in this way.

(Mr. Godber, United Kingdom)

I have referred to these points this morning only in order to clear up any misconceptions that may have arisen from what Mr. Zorin said. I am grateful to him for the honour he has done me in studying so carefully what I have said, and I hope that what I have said on this occasion will not stir him to further displeasure with me.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to thank Mr. Zorin, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Godber for the attention they were kind enough to give to my statement of this morning. I assure them, in return, that I shall study their statements with the greatest of interest. But I should like to make a first very brief reply to Mr. Zorin, who asked me specifically whether I thought the treaty on general and complete disarmament should include a time-limit or date. My reply is "Yes". Perhaps the interpretation of what I said was not very clear. I stressed the need to have a precise and appropriate time-limit, and I said that "a legal obligation without a date is not even an obligation" (supra page 18). But I also said that the time needed to put the whole treaty into effect could not be determined now. The very fact - quoted by Mr. Zorin - that the estimates of these time-limits differ at present shows that it is not possible to fix them immediately in our first text.

The time-limit for the treaty will be the sum of the periods we set for the various measures and the various stages of general and complete disarmament, as we proceed with the formulation of the treaty. There would thus be an agreed time-limit for the whole treaty.

If I understood Mr. Zorin correctly, he would not be entirely opposed to postponing agreement on the question of a time-limit for the treaty. If I did understand correctly, I shall really be very glad, because that would make it much easier to draft our first text quickly at this stage.

Lastly, I should like to thank Mr. Zorin for saying that he would examine my statement of today. I am sure that he will do so with an open mind and the greatest goodwill, for it was in this spirit of goodwill, I can assure him that I examined his text.

Mr. LALL (India): I should like to make some remarks on three points relating to today's consideration of part 1 measures in the document which we will draw up, and are now drawing up in the first-reading manner, on general and complete disarmament.

I am intervening particularly to express the view -- and the considered view -- from what we have heard today that the margin of difference between those who appear to have spoken with different voices is not as great as some people might think. For example, taking the question of foreign bases, on which there has been much argument, the essence of the position stated by Mr. Godber, with whose presentation of this matter I very much agree, is that foreign bases as well as domestic bases must be eliminated. That is what he is trying to put to the Conference. It is precisely the point of the representative of the Soviet Union that foreign bases must be eliminated. The approach of Mr. Godber therefore completely covers the concern which the representative of the Soviet Union has expressed.

I should like to say that I am not at all trying to suggest that he should not express that concern; of course he should; he should express whatever concern he and his Government feel is germane to this study. We ourselves fully realize that the question of foreign bases is a matter of concern from the point of view of certain countries. However, it seems to me that the kind of approach Mr. Godber has suggested is really one which should cover the concern expressed by our Soviet colleague, a concern which, as I say, I understand, and therefore with which I sympathize.

If it is not premature, I should like to suggest a possible way of dealing with this matter, because it has been raised. While I agree with Mr. Godber's approach to this matter, if one takes the United States text (ENDC/18) -- I am not suggesting that we should finally accept that text -- as the basis of the particular suggestion I am about to make, one reads in paragraph 2(a) the phraseology, "disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases", one could say, "including bases, whether domestic or foreign", which would make it quite clear that the elimination of bases was to cover both domestic and foreign bases. I should imagine that it would not be at all impossible to arrive at a formulation of that kind which would make explicit the approach which Mr. Godber has set forth. I continue to mention his name because I do feel he was on the right lines in this matter. If we could put it

(Mr. Lall, India)

in that way -- "whether domestic or foreign" or "whether foreign or domestic", whichever should come first -- I should think the matter could be satisfactorily settled. I think the positions expressed on both sides permit of that sort of settlement.

The second matter I wish to mention is that of a time limit. Here I am a little puzzled that there should be any feeling at all that there is any longer a real issue of principle. I take this view because, although the United States paper does not mention a time limit, and though I myself think it should mention a time limit, the remarks of the representative of Italy and of other representatives of what are called these days the "Western Powers" -- though we ourselves do not like these terms "Western" and "Eastern", because in a world which is round we do not quite know where the West begins and the East ends -- seem to me to mean that they would be quite willing to establish the period for stage 1, the period for stage 2 and the period for stage 3. That is all -- there are no more stages. So if we can establish the time limits for stage 1, stage 2 and stage 3 it is not very difficult for us, though all of us went to school a very long time ago, to add up these three figures and to say that the period for the total plan is the sum of those three. I think that is what our colleague from Italy was saying, but I think he was saying that at this moment he cannot add the figures up because he does not know them yet. I understand that point of view also.

Here I should say, somewhat in parenthesis, that so far as the delegation of India is concerned Mr. Krishna Menon expressed the view of our Government that the whole process should be a quick process, that it should take four to five years. I could argue -- I hope effectively -- that there is much merit in a quick process, much merit from the point of view of both sides, and I will very briefly say why. After all, one side feels that there should be very considerable controls, that there should be controls not only on what is being disarmed but also on everything else, and so on. The other side wants controls of a slightly different nature. Now if there is a rapid process of disarmament leading to zero, obviously the period of uncertainty arising out of the controls not reaching a mathematical 100 per cent is diminished. That is a very valuable consideration, one which I think should lead just those countries which say they favour effective controls to propose a very quick plan. In fact, when the Soviet Union proposed a four-year plan I personally thought that the United States, because of this issue

(Mr. Lall, India)

of controls, would propose a three-year plan, but so far the United States has spoken only of three years for the first stage. It may be that it will be able to accommodate all the stages in three years -- I do not know, that is up to the United States.

Seriously, however, the point is that the quicker the process of disarmament, the more effective general control and, secondly, the less the chance that during the progress of disarmament it would be possible for any country to begin building up afresh by improving its methods, by improving its weaponry; it stops such a country from improving its weaponry so as to counterbalance the effect of the cuts which it makes in any given period. This again is an important consideration. We do therefore favour as swift a programme of general and complete disarmament as possible. That is the position of the Government of India.

However, to return to the question of time limits, it seems to me that there is no great difference in positions. As I said, the Western Powers are agreeable to talking of the period required for each of the three stages -- and it is easy to add up the three periods -- and Mr. Zorin has said today, or so I understood him to say on the translation which came over the ear-phones, that all he wants at this stage, at this first reading, is the statement in part I that general and complete disarmament will be achieved in a set period, the determination of which he says he is quite ready to leave to a later date. That, I think, is in substance what our colleague from Italy said. Again I conclude on this particular point that the differences are now greatly narrowed and can be completely eliminated.

I have just one more point, and that is the question whether we are discussing "objectives and principles" or "obligations". I feel that the points of view expressed are not all that different. The Soviet Union prefers "obligations". I understand why it does. Mr. Godber has said that this is not a very important issue, but he is quite willing to talk of "obligations". He says it is an outline of obligations. Well, that is interesting -- because he elaborated twelve points of agreement. Now, twelve points make it a pretty full outline. Provided what goes into this outline of obligations is sufficiently weighty and significant, and is a full basket, I should imagine that our Soviet colleagues might be quite happy with a heavy outline of that kind, of twelve or fifteen points. Provided it is called "obligations", it should not really matter if it is called an "outline". In other words, if the basket of obligations is full,

(Mr. Lall, India)

but someone wants to call it only an outline of what is coming, I should not think that indicates any serious disagreement. Indeed I think we are very near to agreement on this, and I just wanted to point that out. I trust that the co-Chairmen will find it possible to take these remarks into account.

We understood the representative of the United States to say that he would wish to speak on these issues more fully on Friday, and we would welcome that, of course. I say this because we had thought that today we might be able to fix a deadline for sending in proposals. But if that does not suit some other delegations we are perfectly willing to wait a couple of days and fix a somewhat later deadline. However, in the interests of the very smooth and orderly British method of procedure known as "muddling along", we ought some time to fix a deadline. We can do that when it is found convenient by most members of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I have no other names on the list of speakers. I should therefore like to sum up the programme of work before us.

I think it is agreed that the plenary meeting tomorrow shall be devoted to a discussion on the question of a nuclear test ban. As for Friday, there has been a suggestion by the representative of the United States, supported by the United Kingdom, and I believe by India, that we should have another plenary meeting to go into the other question which we have discussed today -- that is, article 1/part I of the draft treaty. As against that, the representative of the Soviet Union has suggested that this phase of the discussion on article 1/part I of the draft treaty should be closed and that we should now proceed to fix a date for the submission of written proposals or amendments with regard to this particular subject.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I suggested that, on the assumption that no one wishes to speak again on the many questions which have been touched upon, delegations should submit any proposals by Friday. But as the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have expressed a desire to speak again on these matters, I have, of course, no objection to continuing our discussion on Friday and setting a time limit then for the submission of any amendments or additions. Our constant concern has been to expedite our work. I realise that this cannot always be done.

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

But this is something we must bear in mind, and I therefore entirely agree that we should continue our discussion of this matter on Friday and that we should take a final decision then on the time-limit for the submission of amendments and additions with a view to the preparation of a final text of the proposals which have been submitted.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I intervened only to say that I certainly do not wish to hold up our discussions. I only suggested that I might have something further to say on Friday out of courtesy to Mr. Zorin; I wished to study carefully what he said today, after which I thought I might have some further comment to make. But I should be perfectly willing to waive that right if it would help in getting on with our deliberations here. I should not wish to hold up progress in any way, and should therefore not press for a further debate on this particular article.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): I understand that our Soviet colleague has now agreed to discussion of this matter in a plenary meeting on Friday, and that is quite satisfactory to us.

The CHAIRMAN (Burma): If there are no other comments on this point I think it can be so decided.

It was so decided.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its eighteenth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Barrington, the representative of Burma,

"Statements were made by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Soviet Union and India.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 12 April 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

